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The recent financial crisis has shown that financial innovation can have devastating systemic 
impacts. International standard setters’ and national regulators’ response has been a global 
concerted effort to overhaul and tighten financial regulations. However, at a time of 
designing stricter regulations, it is crucial to avoid a backlash against financial inclusion. 
In this chapter, we argue that greater financial inclusion presents opportunities to enhance 
financial stability. Our arguments are based on the following insights: 
—Financial inclusion poses risks at the institutional level, but these are hardly systemic in 
nature. Evidence suggests that low-income savers and borrowers tend to maintain solid 
financial behavior throughout financial crises, keeping deposits in a safe place and paying 
back their loans. 
—Institutional risk profiles at the bottom end of the financial market are characterized by 
large numbers of vulnerable clients who own limited balances and transact small volumes. 
Although this profile may raise some concerns regarding reputational risks for the central 
bank and consumer protection, in terms of financial instability, the risk posed by inclusive 
policies is negligible. 
—In addition, risks prevalent at the institutional level are manageable with known prudential 
tools and more effective customer protection. 
—The potential costs of financial inclusion are compensated for by important dynamic 
benefits that enhance financial stability over time through a deeper and more diversified 
financial system. 
In the following pages, we present the current state of financial inclusion globally. We also 
explore some trends in financial inclusion and what the most effective policies are to favor it. 
In doing so, we suggest that innovations aimed at countering financial exclusion may help 
strengthen financial systems rather than weakening them. 
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1.  WHAT IS FINANCIAL INCLUSION?  
Financial  inclusion aims at drawing the “unbanked”  population into the formal financial 
system so that they have the opportunity to access financial services ranging from savings, 
payments, and transfers to credit and insurance. Financial inclusion neither implies that 
everybody should make use of the supply, nor that providers should disregard risks and 
other costs when deciding to offer services. Both voluntary exclusion and unfavorable risk-
return characteristics may preclude a household or a small firm, despite unrestrained 
access, from using one or more of the services. Such outcomes do not necessarily warrant 
policy intervention. Rather, policy  initiatives should aim to correct market failures and to 
eliminate nonmarket barriers to accessing a broad range of financial services.
1
Despite the considerable progress made by microfinance institutions, credit unions,  and 
savings cooperatives over the last two decades, the majority of the world’s poor remain 
unserved by formal financial intermediaries that can safely manage cash and intermediate 
between net savers and net borrowers. According to the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP), the absolute number of savings accounts worldwide is reported to exceed the 
global population.
  
2  And yet half of the world’s adult population—2.5 billion people—does 
not, in fact, have access to savings accounts and other formal financial services.
3
Financial inclusion as a policy objective represents the current consensus in a long-standing 
debate on the contribution of finance to economic development and poverty reduction (see 
Box 1). It reflects the evolution of financial sector policies in developing countries over the 
past decades, and embodies important insights into the positive  impact that financial 




  Financial sector policies have evolved 
through three stylized stages: first, fostering state-led industrial and agricultural development 
through directed credit; second, market-led development through liberalization and 







At least until the 1980s, many developing countries channeled public funds to target groups 
like farmers and small enterprises, and regulated the scope of activities for which these 
funds could be used. These “directed credit” programs assumed that the rural poor were 
unable to save or to afford market rates of interest, and therefore need loans at subsidized 
rates to build capital. Hence development banks lent at below-market rates to selected target 
groups. To fund cheap loans, deposit rates were often subject to regulatory ceilings, 
                                                 
1 . Demirguç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan (2008). 
2. CGAP (2009a).  
3. Chaia and others (2009).   
4 . The development benefits of financial services will be addressed in the section on implications for 
macroeconomic efficiency and welfare. 
Box 1. Financial Development versus Inclusion 
Conventional measures of financial development reflect traditional policy 
objectives. The focus on aggregate capital accumulation resulted in 
“domestic credit to the private sector” (as a percent of GDP) being the 
most prominent measure of the “depth”  of financial development. Its 
impact on growth is well established, but  it  is poorly correlated with 
“breadth” or financial access. Hence financial deepening and financial 
access are only weak substitutes as policy goals. Growing evidence of 
links from inclusion to equity, growth, and poverty alleviation have turned 
inclusion into a stand-alone policy objective. 
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undermining domestic resource mobilization. The results of “financial repression”  were 
typically shallow financial systems and institutions that had little capacity to allocate 
resources efficiently according to risk-return characteristics. In addition, poor targeting 
yielded transfers through highly repressive subsidized interest rates, and subsidies 
weakened financial institution performance. Not only did these programs typically prove to 
be  unsustainable, they also did not improve outreach of financial services to the poor, 
particularly in rural areas. 
At the end of the 1980s, a new approach emerged  that focused on the performance of 
financial institutions in delivering their services to segments of the population with little or no 
access to finance. The changes were substantial: the new approach shifted the discussion 
away from individual firms and households onto institutions and their ability to provide 
services on a sustainable and widespread basis. Initial  experiences in Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, and some other countries demonstrated that microfinance and rural 
finance conceived as “banking with the poor” are indeed financially viable and may thus 
increase outreach on a sustainable basis. These encouraging examples led to a new view 
called the “financial system” paradigm.
5
Over the past few years, microfinance has undergone a rapid transformation as its links to 
the formal financial system have been expanded. Growing theoretical and empirical 
evidence suggests that financial systems that serve low-income people promote pro-poor 
growth.
  The underlying assumptions of this approach were 
that poor people can generate an economic surplus, which enables them to repay the real 
costs of loans and to save. The term microfinance came to replace “microcredit,” the former 
being used increasingly to refer to a variety of financial products such as loans, deposits, 
insurance, payments,  and remittances offered by a variety of regulated and unregulated 
financial institutions.  
6
With this increased attention to the poverty alleviation aspects of finance, policy objectives 
are being constantly expanded to include more quality access to a wider range of financial 
services.
 Lack of access to finance,  therefore,  adversely affects growth and poverty 
alleviation. It makes it more difficult for the poor to accumulate savings and build assets to 
protect against risks, as well as to invest in income-generating projects. As a result, the 
interest in financial sector development has increasingly focused on the factors that 
determine not only the depth but also breadth of access, in a move toward inclusive financial 
systems. 
7  This trend has been facilitated by the development and rapid diffusion of 
information and communication technology that dramatically reduces the cost of connecting 
users to formal financial institutions through payment systems, with potential spillovers into a 
broader range of services.
8
Against this background, financial services to the unbanked have become a major area of 
interest for policymakers, practitioners, and academics who increasingly emphasize financial 
inclusion as a policy objective. The notion of building inclusive financial systems recognizes 
not only the goal of incorporating as many poor and previously excluded people as possible 
into the formal financial system, but it also assigns to mainstream financial institutions the 
role of reaching out to the unbanked.
  
9
                                                 
5.  Otero and Rhyne (1994). 
  From this perspective, microfinance is now seen as 
an integral part of an inclusive financial system. As a result, financial inclusion has become 
an important policy goal that complements the traditional pillars of monetary and financial 
stability, as well as other regulatory objectives such as consumer protection.  Policies to 
encourage increased access for the previously unbanked must, however,  take  into 
6.  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004). 
7.  Morduch (1999); Robinson (2001). 
8 . See Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan (2008); UN Capital Development Fund (2006). 
9.  UN Capital Development Fund (2006). ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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consideration the objectives of financial stability, especially in light of the current economic 
and financial crisis.
10
All these policy changes were possible because at the microlevel, views on  household 
behavior with respect to financial services have changed dramatically. Today, it is 
understood  that poor households rely on a variety of financial instruments in the daily 
management of their cash flows and risks, and in their endeavors to build assets through 
saving. Tools such as financial  diaries show that the key challenge faced by these low-
income households is the irregularity of their cash flows.
   
11 The average income at the 
international poverty line of $2 a day translates in practice into a highly variable flow that 
requires active management to smooth consumption and reduce vulnerability to various 
shocks, such as health risks, as well as to cope with major life cycle events.
12
2.  HOW TO MEASURE PROGRESS?  
 
Reliable and comprehensive data that capture various dimensions of financial inclusion are a 
critical condition for evidence-based policymaking.
13
This presents several challenges, though. Thus  the definition of financial indicators has 
traditionally been shaped by previously formulated policy objectives. On other occasions, 
some indicators may introduce important distortions into the analysis prior to policymaking 
discussions by prioritizing aggregate volumes over numbers and characteristics of clients. 
 That includes the definition of consistent 
financial inclusion indicators that not only may set a clear direction for policymaking by 
translating the concept of financial inclusion into operational terms but also may allow 
tracking progress and measuring outcomes of policy reforms. 
Broadly speaking, financial inclusion can be measured through the following lenses in order 
of complexity:  
—Access: the ability to use available financial services and products from formal 
institutions. Understanding levels of access may require insight into and analysis of 
potential barriers to opening and using a bank account for any purpose, such as 
cost and physical proximity of bank service points (for example, branches  and 
ATMs). A very basic proxy for access can be derived by counting the number of 
open accounts across financial institutions and estimating the proportion of the 
population with an account.    
—Quality: the relevance of the financial service or product to the lifestyle needs of 
the consumer. Quality encompasses the experience of the consumer, demonstrated 
in attitudes and opinions toward those products that are currently available to them.  
The measure of quality therefore would be used to gauge the nature and depth of 
the relationship between the financial service provider and the consumer as well as 
the choices available and consumers’ levels of understanding of those choices and 
their implications.  
—Usage: beyond the basic adoption of banking services, usage focuses more on 
the permanence and depth of financial service and product use. Hence determining 
                                                 
10.  Hawkins (2006). 
11. “The Financial Diaries project is a year-long household survey that examines financial management in poor 
households” in South Africa. Data are “captured into a specially designed Access Database that produces 
customised diary questionnaires for each household, as well as a system of reports that allows for continuous 
data surveillance.” The overall aim of the project, which is funded by the FinMark Trust, the Ford Foundation, 
and the Micro Finance Regulatory Council, is to get a better grasp of how poor people manage their finances. 
See www.financialdiaries.com. 
12.  Collins and others (2009). 
13. This section is based on Bankable Frontier Associates (2009). ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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usage requires more details about the regularity, frequency, and duration of use 
over time.  To measure usage, it is critical that information reflect the user’s point of 
view, that is, data gathered through a demand-side survey.      
—Impact: measuring changes in the lives of consumers that can be attributed to the 
usage of a financial device or service poses serious methodological challenges to 
survey design. 
This information can be sourced either from the demand  side,  that  is,  at the individual, 
household, or firm level, or from the supply side, that is, at the level of a financial institution, 
or from a combination of both. The key surveys that have produced relevant data have been 
compiled by CGAP.
14
With all these elements in mind, it can be stated that measurement of financial inclusion 
serves two primary objectives that imply different data needs:  first,  measuring and 
monitoring levels of financial inclusion, and second, deepening understanding about factors 
that correlate with financial inclusion and, subsequently, the impact of policies.   
 
These primary objectives can be broken down to more basic levels (Figure 1). Measurement 
data can be used to approximate the number of people who have access to or are currently 
using some type of financial service or product. Provided these data can be linked to other 
in-country factors, such as population characteristics, they can also help identify priorities 
and catalyze changes in policy and approach. If collected repeatedly, these data can also be 
used to monitor progress over time.  On the other hand, data can also deepen 
understanding of the problem of financial inclusion. This is typically entails a more complex 
method of design and collection. This type of data is more appropriate to support solution 
building and impact measurement of policies put in place. 













Source: Porteous (2009). 
3.  FINANCIAL INCLUSION TRENDS  
There has been significant but uneven progress toward financial inclusion around the world 
in recent years. Some of these steps have been driven by market-friendly policies that will be 
presented in more detail in a later section.  
                                                 
14. Kneiding, Al-Hussayni, and Mas (2009).  ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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Some countries in Asia, such as India and Indonesia, have a long tradition of emphasizing 
access to finance.
15
Other success stories include: 
  At the regional level, these policy priorities have paid off: 25 percent of 
households living on less than $2 a day now have access to formal or semiformal financial 
services, compared to 40–50 percent of the population as a whole.  
—Mongolia: a successful turnaround of a state bank increased the number of deposit 
accounts by over 1.4 million since 2006, now reaching 62 percent of households. 
—Philippines: mobile phone banking has expanded to serve to 4 million clients since 
2002. 
—India: access to credit among the poor is up from 7 percent in 2004 to 20–5 
percent in 2009, as the microfinance sector added 9.9 million clients. 
—Bangladesh: 4–6 million new microcredit clients have been added since 2006; 
financial services have reached about 55 percent of poor households, substantially 
expanding access to savings. 
—Viet Nam: 2.1 million new microfinance clients have been added since 2006. 
In contrast, access in People’s Republic of China (PRC) appears to have declined since the 
reforms of the rural cooperatives. Also, India’s poor have little access to deposits: “no frills” 
accounts have increased to over 28 million, but studies show that many of these are barely 
used.  
Particularly in Asia, the poor are often served by public banks or nonbank entities, including 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with private sector banks playing a smaller role. 
Key examples of these public banks and nonbank entities include:  
—Pakistan:  Post Savings Bank, with 3.6 million accounts in 2006. 
—India:  post offices, with 60.8 million savings accounts as of March 2007. 
—Bangladesh: Rural Development Board, with 4.7 million active borrowers in 2007. 
—Viet Nam:  Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, with 10 million farmer 
clients in 2007, and Bank for Social Policy, with 6.79 million active borrowers in 2008.  
—Thailand: Government Savings Bank, with 36 million accounts in 2006.  
—Sri Lanka: state banks, which were used by 72 percent households by the end of 
2006. 
However, despite this outreach, service quality is inferior, and most institutions depend on 
subsidies.  Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, despite remarkable improvements in India 
and Bangladesh, an estimated 535 million people in these two countries still are excluded 
from financial services. Table 1 shows how countries in Asia sort out by their level of 
financial inclusion. 
                                                 
15. The information on Asia in this section is based on Fernando (2009). ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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Source: Fernando (2009) 
Table 1: Level of Financial Inclusion, Asia 
Percent of adult population or households included 
Level of financial inclusion  Countries 
High:  >50  Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Mongolia 
Intermediate:  30–49  India, People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Viet Nam 
Low:  <30   Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, Papua New 
Guinea, Pakistan, Lao PDR, Timor-Leste, Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati 
   Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Africa faces substantially larger challenges than most of Asia, mostly due to a much higher 
incidence of poverty.
16  FinScope household surveys that are comparable across countries 
illustrate this difference for eleven countries (Figure 3). While across Asia 25 percent of poor 
households have access to formal financial services, individual countries in Africa rarely 
demonstrate such a level of household access.
17
                                                 
16. Information on Africa draws on Makanjee (2009). 
  
17. FinScope surveys (designed and managed by FinMark Trust, established in 2002 with funding from the U.K. 
Department for International Development) are nationally representative market segmentation  studies that 
explore consumers’ perceptions and usage from informal to formal products. See www.finscope.co.za. ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
 
7 
Figure 3: Africa: Access by Degree of Formality 












Formal (bank) Formal (other) Informal Financially excluded
 
Sources: Finscope 2009 brochures for South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia. See www.finscope.co.za. 
In Africa, Kenya has pioneered an interesting process  of financial inclusion through 
leapfrogging to mobile phone payment solutions (discussed below). Within only three years, 
the Kenyan telecommunications provider Safaricom has attracted 7.9 million subscribers to 
its short message service–based transfer scheme, with significant positive impacts on 
users.
18
Latin America is home to some of the best regulatory environments for microfinance, such 
as Peru and Bolivia.
 
19
Brazilian policymakers achieved universal coverage of over 5,500 municipalities by enabling 
banks to use retail agents. This new low-cost delivery channel triggered a massive 
expansion of formal financial services to 12 million clients in only six years. Other countries, 
such as Colombia and Peru, are replicating this model.  
  In these two countries, rapid growth over the past seven years has 
included 6 million clients in the formal financial system. Two new policy tools stand out.  
Latin America has also demonstrated the potential of conditional cash transfers into 
simplified bank accounts as a way to connect beneficiaries to formal finance while 
simultaneously lowering delivery costs to the government. Transfer challenges motivated the 
use of agents in Brazil.
20  In Mexico, beneficiaries increased savings and investment, and 
more than 90 percent of households started to use banking services.
21
                                                 
18. Morawczynski and Pickens (2009); Safaricom (2009). 
   
19. Economist Intelligence Unit (2009). 
20. See Kumar and others (2006). 
21. Zimmerman and Moury (2009). ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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Despite these impressive achievements, half of the world’s population is still without access 
to savings accounts, insurance, and other financial services, and about 95 percent of the 
unbanked are in developing countries. 
4.  THE RELATION BETWEEN POVERTY AND FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION: RECENT EVIDENCE  
As mentioned previously, collecting reliable financial data is not an easy task. A common 
obstacle is that both current levels and recent progress in financial inclusion vary 
substantially across countries. Most countries are only beginning to track financial inclusion, 
so data for projecting longer-term trends are not yet available.  In addition, comparing survey 
results across countries is often difficult because methodologies used often differ from one 
survey to the next. 
CGAP’s Financial Access 2009, a global survey of regulators with regard to financial access, 
focuses on individual account holdings with regulated institutions. Using a statistical model to 
fill in data gaps, the survey finds 6.2 billion bank deposit accounts globally. Because of the 
aforementioned challenges faced by survey collectors, this number may include substantial 
double counting of users, which may therefore mask a rather uneven distribution. Assuming 
three bank accounts per banked adult, the CGAP survey arrives at an estimate of 2.6 billion 
unbanked adults in the developing world.
22
Another recent survey is the World Bank’s composite access indicator.
  
23  It suggests that 
financial inclusion is an issue well beyond households living on less than $2 a day (see 
Figure 4).   Instead, it shows how in many countries, the number of financially excluded 
adults significantly exceeds the adult population living under the $2-a-day poverty line.
24
                                                 
22. CGAP (2009a). 
 
23. See Honohan (2007).  The correlation between CGAP’s data on individual accounts and the World  Bank 
composite indicator is 0.67. 
24. Due to data constraints, information on poverty and inclusion is not necessarily from the same year for many 
countries. Both variables are relatively slow moving, though. ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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Population under 2$-Poverty Line
Population without Access
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan (2008),  
World Bank “Finance for All” access data 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/PRR_Data_for_Website.xls), and  
World Bank World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org). 
Does this mean there is not a clear correlation between financial inclusion and economic 
development? It seems obvious that financial inclusion has some relationship to economic 
development. However, as Figure 5 shows, the correlation between GDP per capita and the 
composite indicator is imperfect.
25
                                                 
25. The correlation coefficient is 0.55 (significant at the 1 percent level). 
 Thus, for a given income level, there is a wide variation 
around the conditional mean represented by the regression line. This means that many other 
factors play a role determining the amount of people without access to formal financial 
services. In this sense, more research is needed to analyze how policy, by making the 
environment more conducive for the expansion of financial access, plays a role in reducing 
financial exclusion. ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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a. GDP per capita based on 2003–07 average purchasing power parity. 
This idea is reinforced by Figure 6, which shows the correlation between domestic credit by 
the banking sector and financial inclusion. Again, it is possible to appreciate a wide variation 
in access for a given level of financial development.  
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Figure 6: Implications for macroeconomic efficiency and individual welfare
a 
 
Note: a. R2 = 0.55. Financial development matters, but financial inclusion varies widely at similar levels of 
development, suggesting that policy can make a difference.  
Source: Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan (2008),  
World Bank “Finance for All” access data 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/PRR_Data_for_Website.xls), and  
World Bank World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org).   
There is evidence for the impact of financial inclusion on both aggregate growth and 
individual welfare. Consistent with the evolution of policy objectives, the research focus has 
been first on macroeconomic aspects of financial system development; only in recent years 
has it begun to address the microeconomic impacts of financial inclusion. 
4.1  Macroeconomic Evidence  
Financial institutions contribute to growth by reducing information asymmetries that would 
otherwise hinder the efficient intermediation of resources among savers and investors. There 
is substantial evidence that financial development has a causal impact on growth.
26   A 
prominent  explanation is Schumpeter’s view that finance fuels “creative destruction” by 
allocating resources to newcomers that promote innovation and possibly topple 
incumbents.
27 Along these lines, access to finance for new entrepreneurs is an important 
ingredient in the finance-growth nexus.
28
                                                 
26. Beck and de la Torre (2006); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2004); Honohan (2004); Levine (2005). 
  
27. Beck and de la Torre (2006).   
28. De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007). 
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More recently, the focus has shifted to links between finance and income inequality. Beck 
and others (2008) found a link between financial development, reduced income inequality, 
and poverty alleviation:  the aggregate usage of financial services, that is, deeper financial 
systems, appears to reduce Gini coefficients, a measurement of inequality.    
There is also evidence at the macroeconomic level that broader financial systems enhance 
economic growth. Giné and Townsend (2004) show that, based on a general equilibrium 
model of the Thai economy, the expansion of access to the financial sector has significantly 
raised Thailand’s growth rate. Conversely, Banerjee  and others  (2009) emphasize the 
efficiency and productivity losses associated with preferential access to finance by the better 
off, and suggest a potential first-order effect of access on investment and growth. 
Finally, Pande and Burgess (2005) find a strong positive effect on rural poverty, using a 
“natural experiment” of new branching regulations in India that incentivized banks to expand 
into underserved areas. However, the high cost of this expansion policy outweighed the 
aggregate benefits. This result suggests large potential benefits from technology-enabled, 
lower-cost branch expansion. 
4.2  Microeconomic Evidence  
Until very recently, the support for financial inclusion from a microeconomic level has been 
solely based on plausibility, anecdotal evidence, and data that were not subject to statistical 
tests, such as claims that 65 percent of Grameen Bank clients cross the poverty line.
29
These randomized controlled trials (RCT) are critical to underpin the claim that financial 
inclusion positively affects the poor. RCTs are not without shortcomings, however: while 
methodological rigor produces results with high levels of internal validity, it is much more 
difficult to generalize beyond the specific context of the experiment, that is, external validity 
is substantially weaker.
  
Establishing a causal link from the use of financial services to improvements in the lives of 
the poor is methodologically challenging and very expensive. It requires eliminating 
influences of self-selection and survivor biases in the sample, as well as numerous 
unobservable effects that may confound the analysis. The method of choice is field 
experiments that establish this link through the creation of a counterfactual by randomly 
dividing a subset of the population into treatment and control groups. Statistical analysis is 
then used to identify the differential effects of the intervention, such as exposure to a certain 
type of financial service.  
30
A number of RCTs have been conducted so far.  In Kenya, a randomly selected group of 
rural poor were offered savings accounts. The impact was found to be highly positive: uptake 
was very significant for female clients, and female market vendors reached higher daily 
expenditure levels within six months of opening an account.
 
31
Another RCT example from India provides evidence that the effect of microcredit depends 
on household characteristics:  
 There was no evidence that 
savings accounts crowd out other investments, and neither was  there evidence that the 
savings accounts allowed for more efficient smoothing over bad shocks, particularly 
sickness. This study also shows a more significant positive impact of savings accounts for 
women than for men.  
—Business owners use credit to expand their businesses, as demonstrated by an 
increase in spending on durables and an increase in business profits.  
                                                 
29. Grameen Bank (2007). 
30. For further criticism, see Rodrik (2008). 
31. Dupas and Robinson (2009). ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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—Those initially identified as having a low propensity to start a business do not 
increase investment  but rather increase consumption,  such as food and 
transportation.  
—Households with  a  high propensity to start a business reduce nondurable 
spending, increase durable spending, and reduce temptation spending.
32
Over the eighteen-month period of study, there were no significant effects on education, 
health, or women’s empowerment. However, business outcomes were significantly positive, 
including the creation of new businesses and the profits for existing business. While the 
impact on female welfare could not be established (despite frequent claims to the contrary), 
one has to take into account the limited time horizon. 
 
Recent research in South Africa  highlights the risk management benefits of financial 
inclusion. 
33
Given the difficulty with drawing generalized conclusions from RCTs, new tools will be 
needed to deepen understanding about which services matter most to low-income 
households and microenterprises, how they impact welfare metrics, and how policy tools can 
help relax binding constraints on the access frontier. 
 Loan applicants that had been declined “at the margin” were randomly offered 
loans and turned out to be significantly less likely to report leaving a job after entering the 
experiment than those rejected clients without loans. Treated households earned more and 
were more likely to move out of poverty. Overall, increased access to credit appears to 
improve welfare.  The study does present evidence that short-term loans are an important 
cash flow management tool and that they have largely positive impacts on people’s welfare, 
particularly in the area of employment and income. The study also found that loans to 
customers at (or slightly beyond) the margin were actually profitable. 
In conclusion, recent evaluation techniques suggest that positive effects of microfinance 
exist, but they may be not as overwhelming as assumed or may take more time to 
materialize. There is room for further research to produce more empirical evidence in 
support of the need to pursue financial inclusion as a policy objective. 
5.  FINANCIAL INCLUSION POLICIES: RECENT 
INNOVATION 
The financial sector is prone to market failure and, therefore, is generally heavily regulated. 
The low-income segment is particularly plagued by information asymmetries as participants 
on the demand side often lack a track record or collateral to pacify lenders’ concerns. In 
addition, lenders lack experience in new markets at the bottom of the pyramid and face 
adjustment costs regarding business processes. At the same time, the limited size of both 
individual transactions and the overall market pose challenges to suppliers that need to 
recover fixed costs.  
However, once the pioneers of the microfinance revolution demonstrated tangible market 
opportunities, substantial business model innovation has expanded the “access possibilities 
frontier.”
34
Policies are a key complement to private sector innovation through regulatory frameworks, 
public ownership, the provision of market infrastructure, and measures that lower demand-
side barriers. Regulatory frameworks determine the set of institutions that are allowed to 
enter, shape the scope of available services, and affect institutions’ cost of doing business. 
  More recently, technological innovation has dramatically lowered the fixed costs 
of reaching the low-income segment and attracted a broader range of new suppliers.  
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Prudential regulation is critical to enable financial intermediation  and  facilitate domestic 
resource mobilization and financial institution growth while simultaneously protecting savers. 
Furthermore, public ownership has frequently expanded outreach into segments that were 
considered beyond the scope of commercial approaches. Secured lending frameworks and 
public credit registries facilitate transactions despite asymmetric information. Finally, the low 
education  level  of poor clients suggests a need for consumer protection and financial 
education policies.  
Policymakers have struggled to accompany rapid innovation. They have been particularly 
successful where they facilitated experimentation within regulatory frameworks that carefully 
limited the potential risks. In some cases, policymakers have even taken the lead in 
introducing new solutions to the market through regulatory or legislative measures or direct 
participation in the market. 
The rapid pace of innovation has substantially increased the complexity of policymaking. On 
the one hand, this calls for a rethinking  of policy principles with respect to financial 
inclusion.
35
To capture and compare emerging policy trends in developing countries, the German 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit or GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) 
assessed thirty-five policy solutions geared toward promoting financial inclusion across ten 
countries.
 On the other hand, there is substantial scope for stepping up peer-to-peer advice 
as innovative solutions are being generated by developing country regulators.  
36
5.1  Agent Banking 
   Six solutions were found to be particularly effective. Four have improved 
conditions for reaching the poor through various channels, including agent banking, mobile 
payments, diversification of providers, and state bank reforms. The remaining two solutions 
are consumer protection and financial identity policies, which play key roles in enabling 
financial inclusion. 
Policies that enable banks to contract with nonbank retail agents as outlets for financial 
services have proven highly successful in advancing financial  inclusion where bank 
branches are not economically viable. Such policies leverage existing retail infrastructure as 
delivery channels, and turn pharmacies, post offices, or supermarkets not only into agents of 
banks but agents of financial inclusion. 
Collaboration among banks and agents has become possible as technology has reduced the 
costs and risks of the remote exchange of information to carry out financial transactions. 
Coupled with simplified account opening procedures and other incentives to use this 
channel, such as the delivery of cash transfers, financial system outreach and numbers of 
users can increase explosively, as recently observed in Brazil. 
Brazil was the early leader in agent banking through the large-scale introduction of “banking 
correspondents” to distribute welfare grants to unbanked Brazilians. This solution addressed 
a key physical access barrier: only 1,600 municipalities had bank branches in 2000.
37 Today, 
some 95,000 correspondents cover all of the 5,500 municipalities, and nearly 12 million 
accounts were opened at agents over three years. The Brazilian success has inspired 
similar approaches in Colombia, Peru, Mexico,  and Chile.
38
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enabling regulations allowing financial institutions to use retail agents, attracting 3,539 
agents that initially focused on bill payments.
39
Given the topography of  Latin America—often a major obstacle to improving access to 
financial services—it is not a coincidence that agent banking schemes are blooming in the 
region. With a huge percentage of population concentrated in large cities, the minority living 
in remote rural areas do not receive enough attention in terms of infrastructure, 
communications development, and  services.  This is particularly evident in countries like 
Brazil or Peru, where these minorities account for millions of people, affecting equally both 
poor and better-off residents. That is why, as shown in Figure 4, in countries like Brazil, 
Russia,  or Mexico,  the  population  without access to financial services outnumbers  the 
population living on less than $2 a day to a greater extent than holds in smaller countries. 
 
Critical features of the agent banking model are timely transaction settlement to minimize 
fraud, simplified account opening procedures, and customer due diligence compliant with 
international know-your-customer standards. The cost savings are substantial: according to 
the Peruvian Superintendence of Banks,  forty  banking agents may be established for 
roughly the same cost as one bank branch.
40
The experience of Brazil offers valuable lessons for countries. A Brazilian agent is a service 
provider of a bank or other financial institution. Any institution that  is supervised by the 
central bank can contract an agent, and anyone can become an agent as long as the bank 
takes the responsibility and the relationship is governed by a public contract. The success of 
this model is based on its pragmatic and flexible approach. While the oversight is focused on 
the financial institution, with the central bank getting access to all data on the agent, it also 
gives the financial institution enough freedom to articulate the relationship with the agent on 
its own terms. The Mexican case shows that know-your-customer procedures for smaller 
transaction authority can also be delegated to agents. 
 
5.2  Mobile Payments 
Globally, 4 billion mobile phone subscriptions were projected for 2009, well over half of them 
in the developing world.
41   Mobile phone penetration in developing countries has almost 
tripled in the past five years, with Asia in particular showing high growth rates (see Figure 7). 
In Kenya, for example, 47 percent of adults own a mobile phone, and the rate of ownership 
rises to 73 percent in urban areas and 80 percent in Nairobi.
42
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Figure 7: Evolution of GSM Mobile Phone Subscribers
a 
 
Note: a. GSM, global system for mobile communications; CAGR, compound annual growth rate. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on 2009 data from International Telecommunication Union ICT Statistics, Mobile 
Cellular Subscriptions  (www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/). 
Proliferating mobile phones open another delivery channel for basic financial services to 
poor people. This new technology drastically reduces the costs of convenient and real-time 
financial transactions, expands access points, lessens the need to carry cash by introducing 
e-money, and attracts previously unbanked customers. 
Several country cases illustrate the promise of mobile payments for financial inclusion. The 
Philippines launched the first successful mobile payment service in a developing country in 
2004. Two mobile payment operators have an estimated 5.5 million customers. Mobile 
phone transactions cost about one-fifth of those executed through bank branches ($0.50 
versus $2.50).
43
In Kenya, the e-money transfer service M-PESA offered by mobile network operator 
Safaricom has achieved the most impressive outreach of mobile payments thus far. The 
service has experienced rapid growth and currently enjoys a subscription base of more than 
7 million registered customers, many previously unbanked.
 
44 A recent national survey 
illustrates the positive impact on financial inclusion: the usage of semiformal services 
including M-PESA has increased from 8.1 percent in 2006 to 17.9 percent in 2009, while the 
proportion of the population with access to only informal financial services decreased from 
35  percent  to 26.8  percent, respectively. Most important, the share of the population 
excluded from financial service decreased from 38.3 percent to 32.7 percent over the same 
time frame.
45
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44. M-PESA Key Performance Statistics, released by Safaricom June 8, 2009.The most recent statistics are 
available online at www.safaricom.co.ke/fileadmin/template/main/images/MiscUploads/M-
PESA%20Statistics.pdf. 
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Mobile payments challenge regulatory capacity as they cut across various regulatory 
domains, including banking, telecommunications, payments systems, and anti–money 
laundering regimes. Where mobile payments have taken root, regulators have tended to 
adopt a “test and see” approach that allows operators to experiment and develop their 
business models under close supervision. Once market innovation and learning have 
satisfied the needs of regulators and mobile operators, regulation has been created and 
implemented to provide legal certainty and to create a level playing field to allow new 
players. 
5.3  Diversifying Providers 
Policymakers have adopted various regulatory and supervisory strategies to manage the 
risks of licensing a wider range of institutions to offer deposit and insurance products. 
Strategies to adapt banking regulations to the specific nature of microfinance include:  
—licenses for specialized institutions dedicated to taking microdeposits,  
—bank licenses for successfully transforming financial NGOs, or  
—licenses for nonbank financial institutions.  
A tiered regulatory approach that differentiates institutions by permissible activities and limits 
credit risk exposure of lower-tier institutions minimizes risk from the central bank’s 
standpoint.
46
In Peru, Bolivia, and Uganda, regulators have incorporated nonprofit innovators into the 
formal system by creating legal paths toward a license.
  Regardless of the strategy chosen, high-level political leadership has proven 
critical in catalyzing regulatory initiatives to broaden access. 
47
In Bolivia two microfinance NGOs that transformed into banks, and six nonbank deposit-
taking microfinance institutions (known as private financial funds), operating under a special 
regulatory framework, held a combined $955 million in deposits as of June 2008. Of this 
amount, $458 million were held by the private financial funds, which opened almost 136,000 
new savings accounts in the first half of 2008.
  This has led to higher savings, 
benefiting not only consumers but also institutions, enabling them to weather financial crises 
by making them less dependent on external and wholesale funding.  
48  New laws, specially designed for previously 
unregulated NGOs, were passed in 2008.
49
In Indonesia the entry barriers to the financial sector were lowered by the introduction of 
second-tier rural banks during financial sector liberalization in the late 1980s. After initial 
explosive growth due to a very liberal licensing regime and postcrisis consolidation, today 
there are 1,800 rural banks that hold more than $2 billion in deposits in 9.8 million 
accounts.
 The main difference from the preceding model is 
that NGOs will not need to be transformed into private financial funds. Instead, they will keep 
their nonprofit status and be allowed to collect deposits and offer extra financial services. 
NGOs will have the nature of nonbanking financial intermediaries but will be under the same 
rules as banks and financial entities. 
50
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5.4  State Bank Reform  
In many countries, state-owned banks still play a major role in the banking system, and in 
providing financial services to the poor. They are present in about 73 of 102 countries, where 
they hold roughly 15 percent of banking assets.
51  Public banks often are the only financial 
institutions in rural areas with large branch networks, not least because governments have 
used public banks extensively to promote savings and credit in areas of less commercial 
interest, such as agriculture or housing, and to implement social programs.
52
The global picture is rather mixed: some governments have closed down poorly performing 
state banks as the least-cost choice, as did Benin, Brazil, and Peru, while others continue to 
suffer from political interference and mediocre performance. More interesting, however, 
some policymaker-pushed reforms have demonstrated the potential to turn financial 
inclusion into a new, profitable business for state banks.  
  
Rather than restructuring the whole bank, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) and Banco do 
Nordeste in Brazil, for example, created separate lines of business to introduce profitable 
microfinance operations. Key success factors were governance reform and state-of-the-art 
microcredit technologies.  
BRI has over 4,200 village units that serve 3.5 million borrowers and 21 million savers.
53
Banco do Nordeste’s “CrediAmigo” has grown rapidly, becoming to be the second largest 
microcredit program in Latin America since it was launched in the late 1990s. CrediAmigo is 
a microfinance line of business that operates in 2,000 municipalities, providing microcredit to 
400,000 clients for a total portfolio of $155 million.
  
The profit of BRI’s microfinance operations (27  percent  of total loan portfolio) cross-
subsidized the less successful banking operations during the Asian crisis.   
54
5.5  Consumer Protection 
 
Every year 150 million new customers enter financial markets worldwide. Information 
asymmetry between consumers and banks regarding financial products and services puts 
these new customers at a disadvantage. This imbalance is greatest when customers are 
less experienced and the products are more sophisticated. Progress on financial inclusion 
therefore carries the risk of producing more inexperienced and vulnerable customers. 
Many financial institutions ensure that these customers are well served, but  some have 
abused their information advantage to increase profits at the expense of consumers who 
found themselves overindebted, underinsured, or without a return on their investment.  This 
was the case in Bolivia during the early 2000s, where the combination of financial illiteracy, 
unethical practices of some institutions, and some voids in the legal framework resulted in 
abuses. Preventing these situations is critical.   
Consumer protection is generally considered to be a regulatory response to a market 
failure.
55
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Regulators need to understand the consumer perspective to ensure a level playing field. 
Active participation of consumer advocates helps avoid regulatory bias in favor of the 
financial services industry.
56  However, effective consumer advocates exist in only a handful 
of emerging markets.
57
Consumer education can help balance information asymmetries between consumers and 
providers of financial services. New, inexperienced entrants to the market are especially in 
need of education about their rights and responsibilities. Consumer education may be 
delivered by government agencies, consumer associations, or the industry, but most often 
consumer education programs are provided through public campaigns that use the Internet; 
print, radio, and television media; advertising; publications; and training.
   Some regulators mitigate this issue by perusing consumer 
complaints to identify areas of concern and trends in market practices. Supervisory tools 
include reviewing product-related information, conducting on-site reviews, telephone 
interviews, and media surveillance, as well as industry and consumer surveys. 
58
Peru has reduced the number of complaints across the financial system by 32 percent since 
2004 due to the implementation of a holistic system of consumer protection. The regulatory 
agency supervises consumer protection policies and procedures by financial institutions but 
does not directly respond to complaints. In 2008, 99 percent of nearly 400,000 complaints 
were successfully handled by the financial institution itself. Of the remaining 4,000 
complaints, two-thirds were referred to the Consumer Protection Commission, and one-third 
was referred to the financial ombudsman. In addition to oversight by the regulator and 
multiple channels for redress, Peruvian consumers have access to cost information about 
financial services, published daily in newspapers. When this information was first published, 
interest rates dropped by as much as 15 percent in six months. 
 
5.6  Financial Identity 
In most countries, credit information is only provided above a certain loan amount, effectively 
excluding poor customers from the demonstrated benefits of information cost reduction 
provided by credit registries. More fundamentally, such clients may not even have the 
identification documents required to open a bank account.  
Policymakers have begun to address these barriers to access by narrowing the gap between 
the documentation threshold associated with bank accounts and the quality of 
documentation prevalent among low-income clients. As a result, these policies endow clients 
with a financial history and transform their transaction history into a financial asset that they 
can use to leverage access to credit and other banking services. 
In lowering documentation barriers to entry, regulators must decide on the level of risk they 
want to accept to promote inclusion.  To reduce credit and identification risks, Indonesia has 
started to collect local information in the informal financial sector, especially among the 
pooled funds that are popular among the rural poor. This is an opportunity to capture crucial 
information on financial identity and financial history. In India stringent know-your-customer 
norms have been relaxed to allow the creation of low-risk, basic bank accounts with a letter 
from the local government. In South Africa, the regulator has allowed industry to lead the 
way in proposing systems to identify their rural clients, as long as providers are  able to 
ensure the proper assessments, enforcement, and consumer protection. 
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With regard to effective anti–money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of 
terrorism (CFT) regimes, although successful policy reforms (for example, in Kenya) are not 
yet formally compliant with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidelines, regulators 
have adopted alternative mechanisms to ensure minimum compliance with AML-CFT 
approaches to client identification and verification. In the Philippines, regulators have played 
an active role in creating an enabling environment for mobile payments and have shown 
strong commitment to implementing an AFL-CFT regime that allows financial inclusion.
59 
However, particularly in the light of rapid adoption of technological innovation, developing 
country policymakers and regulators increasingly report barriers to financial inclusion due to 
increasing identification burdens.
60
5.7  Assessment 
 
Developing country policymakers are faced with the challenge of managing trade-offs 
between the objective of financial inclusion and other objectives, such as financial stability 
and consumer protection. The policy solutions outlined and illustrated above have been 
successfully implemented in this respect. To summarize, outstanding success stories 
include:  
—Brazil, where new regulations have achieved universal access in only four years by 
enabling partnerships between banks and third-party agents;  
—Kenya and the Philippines, where central banks have had a key role in supporting 
mobile phone payment schemes and left regulatory space to mobile phone operators; 
—Bolivia and Uganda, which have demonstrated that microdeposit-taking  can 
flourish in the regulated financial system with timely and appropriate policies; and 
—Indonesia, which has proved how publicly owned financial institutions may become 
the driving force behind economic development in rural areas. 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that a balance between financial stability and 
financial inclusion objectives can be achieved. None of the recent policy reforms promoting 
financial inclusion has failed in the sense that it produced deficient regulatory, supervisory, 
or corporate governance practices, or unsound financial performance of market participants. 
To the contrary, the policies discussed above have supported an accessible and stable 
financial sector environment. 
The above policy solutions should be assessed against a  widely accepted set of policy 
principles for expanding access to finance. These principles entail: 
—promoting entry of and competition among financial firms; 
—building legal and information institutions and hard infrastructure; 
—stimulating informed demand; 
—ensuring the safety and soundness of financial services providers; 
—protecting low-income and all customers against abuses by financial  services 
providers; 
—ensuring that usury laws, if used, are effective; 
—enhancing cross-regulatory agency coordination; 
—balancing government’s role with market provision of financial services; 
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—using subsidies and taxes effectively and efficiently; and 
—ensuring data collection, monitoring, and evaluation.
61
Overall, the policy solutions described above follow this widely accepted set of policy 
principles for expanding access to finance.
.  
 
Finally, the policy examples discussed above belong to those countries that have 
demonstrated the most considerable gains in expanding financing options for the unbanked. 
As highlighted by the recent Economist  Intelligence  Unit  survey assessing microfinance 
environments in fifty-five  countries, the Philippines, Bolivia, Kenya,  and Uganda (in this 
order) rank among the top ten countries that enjoy the best legal and regulatory frameworks 
for microfinance.
62
6.  TRADE-OFFS AND SYNERGIES BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION AND STABILITY 
 
As it happened during the 1990s with the Tequila Effect (1994) or the Asian financial crisis 
(1997), the current crisis has highlighted the immense value of financial stability  and 
motivated a review of the policy tools available to prevent costly breakdowns of the financial 
system. Since financial inclusion has gained a much higher profile as a policy goal in recent 
years, it is important to inquire to what extent there are trade-offs between the objectives of 
maintaining systemic stability and including a growing number of users of financial services.  
This appears even more relevant since the origin of the current crisis in the subprime market 
at least initially suggested destabilizing spillovers from the lower end of the market to the 
remainder of the system. And of particular concern in many developing countries is the 
additional regulatory uncertainty arising from the rapidly proliferating, technology-driven 
policy solutions that boost small-scale transactions flowing through the national payment 
system.  
On the other hand, lessons learned  suggest that past financial crises have frequently 
bypassed the highly localized markets at the bottom of the pyramid: the microfinance 
segment of BRI remained rock solid throughout the Indonesian crisis, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that financial institutions catering to the  lower end tend to weather 
macrocrises well and help sustain local economic activity.
63  Could it even be possible that a 
more diversified aggregate financial sector balance sheet, spread over a broader variety of 
economic agents, might contribute to a more resilient economy that follows a higher growth 
path? Jean Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank seems to agree, 
declaring that financial stability is made up of three factors:  the amount and quality of 
information available to  players,  the adequacy-inadequacy of the frameworks for crisis 
prevention and resolution, and the level of completeness of the market.
64
This section aims at identifying links between financial stability and inclusion that could give 
rise to either policy conflicts or synergies, and outlines questions for future research. To 
facilitate regulatory decisionmaking, we highlight the potential costs and benefits of financial 
inclusion with respect to stability and stress the need to differentiate among policy tools 
according to their risk profiles given the desired outcome. 
 
Financial stability is a widely accepted public goal because a sound financial system is one 
of the cornerstones for economic growth. However, this goal is substantially harder to define 
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and measure than traditional policy goals,  such as price stability,  and disproportionately 
more contentious.  
Financial stability has a multidimensional scope that  depends on the interplay of key 
elements of the system and requires that the key institutions and markets in the financial 
system remain stable. This does not preclude occasional failures of smaller institutions and 
occasional substantial losses at larger institutions; these “are part and parcel of the normal 
functioning of the financial system.”
65
Financial inclusion changes the composition of the financial system with regard to the 
transactions that take place, the clients that use the various services, the new risks created, 
and possibly the institutions that operate in newly created or expanded markets. Does this 
mix tend to cause financial instability or make it more likely by multiplying the sources of 
potential shocks, or does it counter instability by rendering the financial system more 
diversified? Furthermore, once a financial crisis has occurred, how effective is financial 
inclusion in helping poor households cope with this particular external shock? 
 
6.1  Financial Inclusion: A Potential Cause of Financial Instability?  
According to one definition that stresses asymmetric information, financial instability occurs 
when shocks to the system dramatically worsen information problems so that financial 
intermediation  between  savings and productive investment opportunities breaks down.
66
The exposure of financial institutions to risks from low-income markets depends on the share 
of their revenues that this line of business represents. Specialized microfinance institutions 
are most prone to these risks, although some large public banks have developed a 
significant  footprint in the low-income segment.
  
Among these shocks, those due to deteriorating financial sector or  nonfinancial  balance 
sheets appear most closely related to financial inclusion.  
67   However, microfinance clients typically 
have high repayment rates: when clients have few options in the formal sector, default likely 
implies much higher future borrowing costs in the informal sector. Hence, as formal options 
proliferate, credit bureaus become more important to keep these incentives intact. On the 
other hand, the regulation and risk-based supervision of financial services in low-income 
markets appears better understood than in other segments of the market.
68
Large numbers of clients that frequently transact small amounts put substantial strain on 
supervisory resources but pose limited systemic risk because they represent such a small 
share of overall financial sector assets. And as information technology proliferates, 
supervisory challenges will likely become more manageable. As a result, regulators are, in 
practice, more concerned with issues of consumer protection raised by the lack of 
sophistication among low-income clients, and with reputational risks due to the large number 
of clients involved if a particular institution fails. 
  
This view is confirmed by recent research on a new macroprudential framework that screens 
instruments, markets, and institutions. The study, from  the Bank for International 
Settlements, identifies two types of externalities as the key drivers of systemic risk: joint 
failures of institutions resulting from their common exposures at a single point in time, and 
procyclicality, the fact that the dynamics of the financial system and of the real economy 
reinforce each other, increasing the amplitude of booms and busts and undermining stability 
in both the financial sector and the real economy.
69
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marginal contribution to systemic risk by a financial institution is correlated in a nonlinear 
way with its size and links with other institutions such that smaller institutions contribute 
disproportionately less risk. 
In addition, research by the Federal Reserve demonstrates that the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA), a piece of U.S. legislation intended to incentivize banks to extend 
loans to low-income communities, had little impact on the subprime crisis: few of the 
mortgages that were originated as a result of the CRA fell into the high-risk subprime 
category, and those subprime mortgages that were due to the CRA performed above 
average.
70
Recently, there have been reports about an incipient credit bubble in the rapidly expanding 
low-income sector in India, pointing to risks of excessive credit demand facilitated by lower 
financial education in developing countries.
 
71  Most observers believe excessive borrowing to 
be a recurrent yet locally isolated phenomenon that validates recent policy concerns with 
consumer protection.
72
In sum, financial inclusion introduces new lines of business with idiosyncratic risk profiles 
that can be appropriately regulated and supervised. The contribution to systemic risk is likely 
to be rather low, especially relative to consumer protection and reputational risk 
considerations. Especially with respect to technology-based financial inclusion policies, such 
as mobile phone banking, regulatory concerns have focused on financial integrity rather than 
stability through FATF policy frameworks  to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  
  Given the high share of nonprofit institutions in the in the sector, 
excessive lending may be driven by disbursement pressure rather than profit motives, in 
contradistinction to the subprime crisis. In addition, vast unmet demand makes bubbles less 
likely to develop on a larger scale. 
The implementation of FATF standards requires a risk-based approach similar  to that 
required for regulation and supervision of institutions serving low-income clients. It has a 
direct impact on financial inclusion because customer due diligence through restrictive know-
your-customer rules may limit outreach potential. National regulations risk either excluding 
people who lack certain proofs of identity or imposing prohibitive cost of compliance on 
financial institutions.
73
6.2  Financial Inclusion: Cushioning Crisis Impact at the Local 
Level?  
 
An oft-cited feature of past crises, especially the Asian financial crisis, has been the stability 
and growth of financial institutions catering to  the poor amid the turmoil that toppled 
internationally  exposed corporate lenders. As a result, local economic activities could 
continue, at least to some extent, or recover more quickly.  
Microfinance institutions that do not mobilize deposits tend to be harder hit when a systemic 
crisis triggers a credit crunch, so that funds for on-lending to low-income clients are no 
longer forthcoming because existing credit lines cannot be rolled over. This has also been 
observed during the current crisis (CGAP 2009a). The transmission of a higher-level crisis 
through this credit channel can have a severe consequences for the local economy that 
otherwise might be more isolated from national or even international shocks. 
It remains an empirical question to confirm beyond anecdotal evidence how important local 
financial intermediation is as a transmission mechanism for (or protection against) an 
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economy-wide crisis. Similarly, household use of savings for risk management during a crisis 
should be better researched to explore the stability of the local financial system. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION EQUIPS THE POOR TO COPE 
WITH INSTABILITY 
The global economic crisis, despite its roots in financial sectors of industrial countries, will 
likely shift the focus of future financial inclusion policies. The fundamental rethinking of the 
role of government in finance triggered by the crisis has built huge momentum for regulatory 
change. Policymakers should seize the current reform drive to advance financial inclusion 
policies that foster economic resilience. 
Postcrisis opportunities to promote financial inclusion hinge on the careful analysis of the 
risks posed by the transactions of the poor. In the absence of such analysis, the heightened 
risk perception could usher in an indiscriminate restriction of innovation. In formulating 
financial inclusion policies, policymakers should leverage successful innovations developed 
by their peers that realized the benefits of financial inclusion in safe ways.  
Peer-to-peer exchange among developing countries,  as facilitated by the Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion—a global network of policymakers in developing countries—will help 
refine and spread these insights widely, enabling other countries to adapt and scale  up 
successful innovations.  
Most important, the crisis calls for a shift from credit to savings. Access to savings should be 
a top priority because it promises three important benefits: 
—enhanced household  capacity to manage the vulnerabilities exposed by the 
devastating impact of the crisis,  
—diversified funding base of financial institutions to cushion the impact of a global 
credit crunch on domestic financial intermediation, and  
—deeper financial systems that enhance economic resilience by accelerating growth, 
facilitating diversification, and reducing poverty.  
The 2.5 billion unbanked adults are especially vulnerable to economic shocks because they 
are confined to the inferior risk management features of informal finance. Low-income clients 
that can build assets before a crash have somewhere to run for cover. 
Research has revealed substantial pent-up demand for formal savings that help overcome 
the costly credit barriers to business expansion. As a result, income and expenditures grow, 
and health outcomes prove more resilient to turmoil. Better household capacity to manage 
risks frees up public expenditure during times of crisis. Financial inclusion also has been 
shown to reduce income inequality. Stronger social cohesion helps prevent political 
instability and permits undivided attention to crisis management. Social safety nets can 
simultaneously boost financial inclusion when benefits are delivered through basic bank 
accounts in the formal financial sector. With the subprime meltdown illustrating the dangers 
of reckless lending practices, consumer protection has surfaced on the policy agenda. 
Financial education initiatives have been gaining momentum recently; policymakers now see 
a stronger rationale to build financial education into high school and college curricula, and 
seek greater participation from the private sector in this endeavor. 
However, further research is needed, especially in the following fields: 
—Key barriers to access:  at the strategic level, systematic diagnostic efforts to 
identify “binding constraints” to financial access will help policymakers set priorities 
for action.  ADBI Working Paper 259    Hannig and Jansen 
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—Randomized controlled trials (RCT):  more effective incorporation of RCT into 
regulatory decisionmaking will allow for a deeper understanding of the impacts of 
specific products or services, and should be used more systematically to obtain 
insights into the appropriate sequencing of reforms.  
—Data and evidence: updated information on levels and trends of financial inclusion 
is a critical step toward evidence-based policy decisions. Data collection must be 
tailored to objectives and available resources. Policymakers should expand 
collaboration with local researchers to build capacity for the collection of demand-side 
data. 
—Risk: greater risk analysis of the scaling-up of technology-based financial inclusion 
policies with respect to financial stability is necessary to fill critical knowledge gaps 
due to rapid recent innovation. 
Overall, a combination of showcasing of viable business models at the bottom of the 
pyramid, technological innovation that lowers transaction costs, and rapid growth and 
progress in poverty alleviation over the past years has helped to attract substantial private 
sector investment and pushed the access frontier outwards. Policymakers have facilitated 
strong results by adapting regulatory frameworks to financial innovation in the low-income 
market segment, and have been able to do so without falling short of their policy goals of 
financial stability  or customer protection. With these recommendations in mind,  there is 
potential to make the necessary gains in expanding financial access without compromising 
financial stability. The current crisis  thus  offers a unique opportunity for policymakers to 
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